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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
\YILBERT J. DAWSON, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
BO.A.RD OF EDUCATION OF 
\VEBER COUNTY SCHOOI_j 
DISTRICT and GUY ELIAS 
CARR, 
Defendants, 
\V·. ED BINGHAM, 
Respondent. 
' 
No. 7391 · 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF F ACT·S 
.A.ppellant's state1nent of the case is somewhat in-
coinplPt<~ as "\Yell as inaccurate, ·and therefore, we prefer 
to 1nake a further staten1ent. 
The aeti ()Jl "\Yas brought to recover damages for the 
death of a n1inor child, J...Ja\Yrence P. Da\vson, age nine 
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yE~nrs, a third grade ~tudent (Tr. 106), \Yho died as a 
re~ult of an auton1ohile accident ~1ay 7, 1948, about 4:30 
P. l\1. ( 'J~ r. 35). The nan1ed def en dan ts in the case ";<ere 
,V. Ed Binghan1, the driver of the school bus on \vhich 
· <lecE~a~e(l ro<lP to and fron1 school, and Guy Elias Carr, 
\Vho \Yas driYing his O\\Tn private automobile, a 1948 
liudson cluh eoupe. Binghan1 drove north on Highw·ay 
U 38 (a t\vo-lane high,vay with gravel shoulders, east of 
\Vhieh "rere grass and brush tw·elve to fourteen inches 
high), and stopped the bus on the graveled shoulder on 
the southeast corner of the intersection of High,vay U 38 
and 4800 South, an east and west street, and had dis-
charged several ehildren east of the bus on the graveled 
shoulder. 
Deceased, who lived west of the highway, left the 
other children ( Tr. 195), started west across the highway 
about twelve feet in front of the bus (Tr. 118) being 
struck by defendant Carr's autom:obile at a place on the 
concrete northw.est from the left front of the bus (Tr. 29, 
43) (See Exhibit "A'.'). There was some conflict as to 
\vhether he "\vas running (Tr. 254). Most of the witnesses 
described him as walking in a stiff-legged manner, as he 
often did (Tr. 96, 101, 104, 112, 119). The body can1e to 
rest sixty-three feet north of the point of impact on or 
near the east shoulder, (Tr. 26, 27, 57) Carr's automobile 
f-'topping t''Tenty-five to thi1·(y feet beyond that (Tr. 200, 
234). 
Defendants "'Tpre sued UT)Oll the theory of joint and 
coneurren t negligence (sec paragraph fj ve of plan tiff'~ 
c-on1plaint, ~1 r. 001). 
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3 
Contrary to the staten1ents of appellant, th<? evidence 
"·as undisputed that the bus u·as sfo,pp.ed zc~ithin a desig-
nated b~t s sf o p. \Yhich \vas posted \Yi thin the confines of 
t'Yo ~tation signs reading, H Srhool Bus Station". One of 
thv~P ~igu~ \Yn~ facing north for southbound traffic ou 
thP "·e:'t side of High,vay l: 38, and the other "\vas facing 
~uuth (that i~, facing northbound traffic) on the east 
~ide, each being about one hundred yards fron1 '''"here the 
hn:-: "~as stopped (Tr. 38, 188). 
Like,vise, :JI r. Binghan1 Icas uot stopped in the lane 
of traffic. The paved portion of the high"'Tay \Yas ·eighteen 
feet (Tr. 20-21) \Yith three feet of asphalt or blacktop on 
each side, 1naking each traveling lane about ten and a 
half feet wide. The bus w_as stopped entirely off the paved 
portion, the \vest side of the bus being according to the 
patrohnan 's n1easure1nents, eight inches east of the east 
edge of the asphalt ( Tr. 21, 22, 37 and 39). 
The evidence "Tas therefore uncontradicted that 
defendant Bingha1n did not violate the provisions of 
Chapter 2, paragraph 2-2 (a) and (b) of the State Road 
Com1nission providing that: 
and 
''The bus shall not pick up or let off students 
except at regularly designated stops.'' 
''The bus shall not be stopped in line of traf-
fice- to load or unload pupils." 
The only cont1"1oversy as to the defendant Bingham 
clnd only possible r lain1 of negligence as to hin1 "\vas 
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4 
whether he violated the ter1ns of the follovving reguation, 
paragraph 2-2 (c)_ providing that: 
''The driver shall require all pupils to pass 
behind rather than in front of the bus.'' 
In this connection, Mr. Binghan1 testified: 
''At this particular corner and many points 
along my route, I have instructed the children to 
be very careful crossing the highway, to look both 
ways on this particular corner, and I instructed 
the children to remain to the rjght hand side of' 
the bus until I pulled away. Out to the right hand 
side of the bus and remain there until I had pulled 
on down the highway. I felt that gives them a 
better opportunity to see the high"\\ray both ways.'' 
(Tr. 193-4.) 
He repeated these instructions almost every night (Tr. 
130, 235, 239). 
There was testimony that the children had not pre-
viously passed in front of the bus (Tr. 195, 203), but 
stood clear until the bus pulled away (Tr. 145). Deceased 
had ridden the bus .two years, since Septen1ber of 1947 
(Tr. 101). 
There was no particular place within the bus stop 
area designated to stop the bus (Tr. 188). While Binghan1 
someti1nes stopped on the north side of 4800 South, east 
of the intersection, when he took the alternate route to 
deliver three children living in the Cozydale area, when 
these children "\Yere not present, he ren1ained on U 38, 
ordinarily stopping vvhere he did on this occasion (Tr. 
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5 
186, 187 ~ :2:.?7 ~ :.?8-!, :238) ~ although hP occasionally stopped 
north of the inter~Pction ( Tr. 238). This lattPr position, 
how'eYPr, "~n8- less convenient to the children because of 
the bru~h and "\Yillo"~~ along the Pntire side of the bus 
(Tr. :~7. -!G. 143~ :216). On the southeast eornPr, therP "\Ya~ 
\Yet grass and "·eeds t\YelYe to fourteen inches high ( Tr. 
:23, 34, ~i7). To avoid these, the bus "\Yas so stopped that 
the front end extended into the south portion of 4800 
~outh. so that the children con1ing out of the· bus door 
had a clear place to alight on the gravel just north of 
the brush (Tr. 36, 46) and there ';vas a little strip of clear 
space bet,veen the east side of the bus and the brush ( Tr. 
39, 40) through \Yhich the children could pass to the 
rear of the bus, or they c:ould have gone through the 
\Yeeds and grass ( Tr. 139), or 'vaited till the bus pulled 
a'vay . 
..._\.s to defendant Carr, the e"vidence showed that as 
h P. Ca IT, drove north, he had a clear view of the sch-ool 
1 n1~. a large bus yello"v in color, with ''School Bus'' 
printed on the rear ( Tr. 30, 38, 68). He saw the school 
bus station (Tr. 246-7), knew it was a school bus stop 
(Tr. 263), and anticipated there would be a bus there 
( Tr. 247). He expected children fron1 the bus Inight be 
crossing the high,vay or dart out fron1 the bus (Tr. 262). 
It 'vas undisputed that he did ·not sound his horn (Tr. 
191, 23G). There "\Vas substantial evidence of speed at 
t\Yent~·-five to thirty 1uiles per hour in a tw-enty n1ile zone 
(Section G7 -7-113 ( 1) ( Tr. 193). The physical facts con-
finn Pel a higher rate of speed, because if he had been going 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
fourteen to sixteen n1iles per hour as testified to by hiln, 
he could have stopped in thirty feet (Tr. 108-109). 
The jury returned a verdict in the an1oun t of $5,000 
against the deftJlldant Carr, and a verdict of no cause of 
action against the defendant, W. Ed Binghan1 (Tr. 346). 
The judgn1ent against the defendant Carr 'vas not 
resisted, and the judgn1ent, including costs against said 
defendant Carr, was paid in full and a satisfiction of 
judgment duly entered (Tr. 0028). (See also appellant's 
acknowledgn1ent thereof, page 3 Appellant's Brief, and 
stipulation filed herein in connection with respondent's 
1notion to dis1niss the appeal.) 
QUESTIONS ON APPEAL 
The only errors claimed by appellant are those 
relating to the court's instructions. By . our motion to 
dismiss, we have added a further question for eon-
sideration by the court, which if well taken, makes 
unnecessary passing on the merits. 
Questions 
We have separated the issues as follo"\\rs: 
I. As to respondent's n1otion to disn1iss, does pay-
ment of the judgn1ent in full by the defendant Carr 
extinguish the alleged cause of action against the defen-
dant Binghan1 ~ 
II. Did the eourt eonnnit revPrsible error in it~ 
instruction~ to the jury, or in refu~ing certain reqnP~tP<l 
instrn('tion~ of plaintiff? 
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I . 
... \R-GlTniENr"r .L\XD ... \lTTHORITIES ON MOTION 
TO DIS1LISS _._\PPEAL 
This court ha~ held that "·here it appears that any 
furthPr prosecution of the 1natter involved in the appeal 
'Yould be ··fictitious and fruitless,'' the appeal "rill be 
disn1issed . 
.An~erica u ( 1eJne ut & Plaster Co. v. Epperson, 
79 Utah 63, 77 Pae. 2nd 581. 
See also: 
Colman v. N etv Y o1~k Life, (Okla.) 44 Pac. 
(2d) 880; 
Srenska etc. v. Weber, (Cal.) 51 Pac. (2d) 65; 
Lane v. Insurance ·c·o., (l(ans.) 8 Pac. (2d) 
403. 
There can be no dispute. as to the facts relating to 
the 1notion to dis1niss. Defendants "'"ere charg-ed in the 
co1nplaint as joint tort feasors, for in paragraph five 
( Tr. 001) it is alleged : 
''That by reason of the joint and concurrent 
negligent operation of the school bus by the de-
fendant ''T· Ed Bingha1n, together with his negli-
gence in per1nitting said child Lawrence P. Daw-
son to go around the front of said school bus into 
and upon said highway, contrary to law and to 
the rules and regulations of the State of Utah, 
and the negligent operation of said automobile by 
the defendant Guy Elias Carr, and as the proxi-
Juate result thereof, injuries "'"Pre inflicted upon 
thP ~aid child T..Ja,vrence P. Da,Yson, deceased, of 
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such a character as to cause and which did cause 
his death on the 8th day of May, 1948." 
The verdicts against defendant Carr and in favor 
of defendant Binghan1 speak for themselves (Tr. 0014-
0015 ), as does also the satisfaction of judg1nent (Tr. 
0028). On thr- face of the record, the appellant has no 
right vvhatever to prosecute this action further, or to 
1naintain any action, against respondent Bingha1n. 
Payn1ent of a judgn1ent by one of two joint defen-
dants operates as a satisfaction and extinguishn1ent of 
the judg1nent as to all, regardess of the intention of the 
parties to the transaction, and even \vhere the judg1nent 
is against joint tort feasor.s. 34 C. J. 689. 
In Eberle v. Sinclair Prairie Oil Co., 120 Fed. (2d) 
7 46, 135 A. L. R. 1494, the action \Vas to recover for the 
death of the plaintiff's intestate, vvho was killed while 
in the employ of a pipe line service company, while re-
pairing a .gas pipe line owned by the defendant. It ap-
peared that plaintiff had previously brought an action 
against the deceased's employer, and in that action had 
executed a contract compromising the claim against such 
en~ployer upon payment to her of a stipulated sun1 and 
releasing such employer from all liability. The settle-
Jnent agreen1ent contained a provision that the plaintiff 
\Vas 'asserting a claiu1 for the death of the intestate 
against the defendant oil con1pany \Yhich \Yas a joint 
tort feasor \Yith the defendant in the case in \Yhich the 
settleinent vvas Inade, but that such settlen1ent \Vas 1nade 
in the former case without prejudice to plaintiff's rights 
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to proceed again8t the oil co1npany a~ a joint tort feasor. 
The judgn1ent \Yhich \YRS entered upon the con1pr,o1nise 
agr~eutent \Ya~ paid in fulL and the court held that. sueh 
il:1ylnt\nt extingni~hP(l the plaintiff'~ rights and cau~e 
of action~ and that t.llP court had no po\Yer to reserve 
any ~o-l·alled riy:ht~ of thP plaintiff to proseeute the 
present ~nit. The eourt in its opinion ren1arked: 
· · _..\._ person injured by a joint tort has a sin-
gle and indivisible cause of action. He 1nay pro-
ceed against the \Yrongdoers either jointly or 
seYerally and 1nay recover a judgn1ent or judg-
ments against all, but he can have but one satis-
faction of his single cause of action. Neither may 
he split his cause of action. The administratrix 
n1ight haYe entered into a compromise with Mc-
George, disnrissed her action against him, re-
leased l\'lcGeorge or covenanted not to sue 'Mc-
George and reserved her right to sue Sinclair and 
Gray. 
''Instead of following that course, the ad-
ministratrix elected to enter into the contract com-
pron1ising and settling her two single causes of 
action, received the sum stipulated in s.atisfaction 
thereof, and submitted the compromise to the 
court for its approval. The eourt by its judgment 
approved the comprise and ,the settlement of the 
t1Yo causes of action and dismissed the action with 
prejudice. The judgment had the same effect as 
though it had been entered in favor of the admin-
istratrix for the stipulated an1ount and had then 
b(_len satisfied upon the payn1ent of that an1ount . 
.T ohnstonc v. Chap1nan, 79 Ore. 67 4, 156 Pac. 286, 
288 . 
. . rrllt' pffect of the settlernent and corrlpron1ise 
of the~ causes of action, the receipt of the sum 
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10 
stipulated, the judgrnent approving the eoHlpro-
Hlise of the causes of action and disn1issing the 
action \vith prejudice w·as an extinguishn1ent of 
the tv\c-o single causes ·of action. The causes of 
action having been extinguished, the District 
·Court of Sen1inole County, Oklahorna, \vas po,ver-
less to reserve the right in the administratrix to 
prosecute another suit on the san1e causes of ac-
tion against Sinclair and Gray.'' 
In Cain v. Quanuah Light & Ice Co., (Okla.) 267 Pac. 
641, the court declarPs : 
''In the instant case, plaintiff procured a 
prior judgment and obtained full satisfaction 
thereof, which satisfaction operates not only as a 
release to the Gypsum Company, but as a com-
plete settlement of the cause of action. In the 
cases· cited by plaintiff, the claims were not re-
duced to judgrnent and settlement and release 
were made prior to judgment. There was no set-
tlement of the cause of action. * * * The plain-
till having no legal right to split her cause of 
action, the court by its judgment could not legally 
grant such right." 
In Vattani v. Do1'niano., (N. J.) 153 Atl. 841, the ac-
tion was for the death of plaintiff's intestate '":bile riding 
in an auton1obile ,,·hich collided \Yith a railroad train. 
It appeared that a judgrnent had been obtained against 
the railroad eo1npany· in another action arising out of 
the san1e accident and had been satisfied, "Thich judg-
rnen t had been entered lH~f o rc\ n ju1·)· in open eon rt hy 
consent and stivulatJ.on. The judg1nent containPd a pro-
Yision that satisfaction thPreof ~hould be \Yithout preju-
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11 
dice to the rig·ht of the plaintiff to 1naintain an action 
again~t nn~T other joint or seYeral tort feasors for daln-
age~ rP~nlting heeau~e of the death of plaintiff's intf\~­
ta te. The X P\Y J er~ey court used this language : 
• · ''nere here \Yt\ haYe the case 'vhere it ap-
pears that the parties did not intend that the judg-
Inent should be satisfaction, \Ye are n1et 'vith the 
conclusion of la" .. that the judgn1ent is in fact a 
detern1ina tion that the lia.bili ty is satisfied. It 
seen1s to me, therefore, that the reservation con-
tained in the judgn1ent is nugatory, as it would 
in fact nullify the judgn1ent itself.'' 
In Tr etu1nka Y. CT ronncell Franklin Oil Co., (9kla.) 
4:3 Pac. ( 2d) 434, the n1unicipality brought a suit against 
a nnn1ber of oil and gas companies for pollution of its 
\Yater supply, and a judgment 'vas entered against some 
of the defendants for $65,000.00, but the case was .not 
disposed of as to the appellee, Crom"rell Franklin Oil 
Con1pany. A journal entry, however, provided: 
''Plaintiff be, and it hereby is allowed to fur-
ther prosecute its cause of action against all de-
fendants named in this action, except those named 
and listed hereinabove, and such right is hereby 
reserved to said plaintiff.'' 
The defendants against whom the judgn1ent "ras ren-
dered satisfied it, and the court held that by such satis-
faction, the cause of action was extinguished and the 
CronnYell Frankin Oil Co1npany 'vas released fron1 its 
joint liahility ':v-ith the defendants w·ho paid the judgn1ent. 
're are not unn1indful of Title 47, Utah Code Anno-
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12 
tated 1943, relating to joint obligations, and particularly 
SPrtion 4 7-0-4, \Yhich provides : 
'' 47-0-4. Release of Coobligor-Reservation 
of Rights. 
Subject to the provisions of section 47-0-3, 
the obligee's rPlease or discharge of one or n1or<' 
of several obligors, or of one or n1ore of joint 
or of joint and several obligors, shall not dis-
charge coobligors against 'vhon1 the obligee in 
'vriting and as parto f the sa1ne transaction as 
the release or discharge expressly reserves his 
rights; and in the absence of such a reservation 
of rights shall discharge coobligors only to the 
extent provided in section 4 7-0-5. '' 
However, this statute 1nust be construed ~ith reference 
to other elen1ents or factors "rhich are not specifically 
mentioned therein. The fact that the statute is specific 
that 
''Release or discharge of one or n1ore several 
obligors, or one or n1ore joint or several obligors 
shall not discharge coobligors against whom the 
obligee in writing and as part of the san1e trans-
action as the release or discharge expressly re-
serves his rights.'' 
should not be construPcl to preyent the full and eolnplPtP 
operation of such a release as to all joint tort feasors, 
if a plaiHtiff has been fully co1npensated for his injury 
by one of the joint tort feasors. This court has declared 
that: 
"There can be but one satisfaction for in-
JUries sustained in one \Yroug." Green v. Lau,rJ, 
-- Utah , 206 Pac. (2d) 626. 
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13 
nnd it quote~ \Yith npproYal Greeuhalch vs Shell O-il ()o., 
7S :B-,ed. ( 2d) ~l+~. 
In th~ GrPPnhaleh ense, tht} Circuit Court of _..\p-
}H~al~ for tht) Tt'nth Circuit co1nineuts quite at ]pugth 
npon tlH~ tTtah ~tatnte, rPf0rs to its uncertainties and 
t·Inpha~izt~~ thn t the rP~erYation in a release of a right to 
proceed again:st other tort ftlnsor~ ean only operate ''if 
full con1pen:sntion has not been reeeived," and it inter-
prets Section -±7 -0-3 to 111eau that "no cause of action 
reu1ains if full con1pensation for the injury is received.'' 
In .A.nlerican Law Institttte Restatenzent, Torts, Vol. 
4, Sec. 886, it is said : 
"The discharge or satisfaction of a judg-
Inent against one of several persons, each of who1n 
is liable for a single harn1, discharges each of the 
others from liability therefor." 
and in the conunent upon this section, it is said: 
''This is true where no judgment has been 
obtained against the other tort feasors, where 
judgments have been obtained against the other 
tort feasors, even for the same amount or for larg-
er amounts in separate actions, and where judg-
l'nents have been obtained against the others in the 
sa1ne action. The rule n pplies \Yhere the t·ort ';vas 
the act of one of thein, for \Y'hich the othPrs \Yere 
liable, \Yhere all acted in concert, and where the 
act of each \Yas 1nerely a contributing factor to 
thP \\7holP. It is innna terial vYhether the onP pay-
ing \Ya~.;, \Yith ref(·n·nce to the one \\·ho has not 
paid, pri1narily or secondarily liable.'' 
In ~llcTi.que v. Lery, :2:3 N.Y. S. (2d) 114, it i~ held 
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that the receipt of payment by the judgn1ent creditor 
on a judgment was held to discharge all tort feasors 
who might be liable to the plaintiff for the same tort, and 
th<) effect of the satisfied judgn1ent, operating as a dis-
rlui.rg·e of th<} others, 'vas not altered by the execution of 
an i1.1~tru1nent \\Thich purported to release the wrong-
do<_~r against '"hom -plaintiff had obtained satisfaction, 
but expressly reservPd her right to proceed against the 
other. The Ne'" York statute provides: 
''The recovery of a judgment without sa tis-
. faction is not a bar to the institution of an action 
against others who are jointly liable,'' 
'Yhich is the lavv in this State 'vithout express enactment, 
and "There the judgment is satisfied, such satisfaction 
extinguishes the cause of action as to all joint tort 
feasors, even. though the statute contains no such express 
prOVISIOn. 
N o"T, the question here IS : Has the plaintiff been 
fully con1pensated? 
In the trial of this cause, the 1neasure of damages 
1'(-'('0Yerable is defined in Instruction 29 ( rr. 008) to 
'Yhich instruction the appellant has taken no exception. 
If the jury had found against respondent, it would have 
hPen contl'olled in the fixing of dan1ages by said instruc-
tion the sa1ne as it was controlled in its verdict against 
Carr. In other '\Tords, Carr and Bingham being charged 
as joint tort fea.sors 'vhose "joint and concurrent" neg-
ligence is alleged to have been the proximate cause of the 
injuries co1nplained of, it must be assumed that $5,000.00 
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\\·n~ thP lll:lxinnnn a1nount \rhieh the jury eonsidered to 
reprP~l)nt the ron1pen~ntory daltU1f?;l)~ to W'hieh the plain-
tiff \ra~ t:)ntitled~ and thi~ i~ truP PYen though the jury 
found that Binghau1 \Yas not liable. It, of course, can-
not be n~sn1ned that under the sa1ne in8truction as to the 
Ineasnn~ of dau1agl1 ~~ the jury \rould or eould hold Bing-
haul for any greatt)r liability than Carr, for the 1neasure 
of da1nag~ is not affected by the quality of the act of 
either defendant. The rule as to such n1easure of dan1-
age is applicable no 1natter "~hat the alleged acts of neg-
ligenee of either or both defendants, and \Yhen the plain-
tiff accepted payn1ent of such con1pensation, it V\Ta.s in 
full of his clai.J.n and extinguished his cause of artion as 
agai11st both tort feasors. 
The ~lotion to Dis1niss the appeal should be granted. 
II 
BRIEF ON THE MERITS 
Appellant assigns as error, the trial court's refusal 
to give appellant's requested instructions numbered .13; 
14, 19, 27~ 28, 31, 32 and 33 (Br. pp. 3-6), and that he 
~~rred in giving instructions nun1bered 12, 13, 14 and 15 
(Br. p,p. 6-7). 
Appellant's Requested Instructions Refttserl 
J~t>que~ted instruction No. 13 (_.A.ppellant's Brief p. 
:~) ( Tr. 003) is erroneous because it vYould require the 
.i nr~· to find in favor of the plaintiff and against defen-
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dant Bingham, merely on the basis of Binghan1's negli-
gence, whether or not such negligence was the proximate 
cause o.f the injuries to the Davvson boy. Negligence alone 
is not sufficient upon 'vhich to predicate liability. It 
1nust be a proxi1nate cause of the injury, and the re-
quested instruction was fatally defective. Beyerle v. 
( ?ift, (Cal.) IIearing denied by Supreme Court, 209 
Pac 1014; LaRue v. Powell (Cal.) Hearing denied by 
Supren1e Court, 42 Pac. ( 2d) 1063. 
Furthern1ore, thP court did by its instructions nm11-
bered 14 ( Tr. 093 and 325) and 21 ( Tr. 0001 and 327) 
instruct the jury in substance as requested by plaintiff. 
The instructions given 'vere in the particular complained 
of even n1ore favorable to appellant than requested since 
the court's instruction No. 14 read: 
, ''You are instructed that it was the duty of 
the defendant, Ed Binghan1, to stop his bus in 
such a position and at su~h a place to require the 
children to pass behind rather than in front of 
his bus. If you find fron1 the evidence that said 
defendant did not ~o so, then you will find that 
he vvas negligent.'' 
rrllt' court's instruetion 1'~ 0. 21 "~as substantially the 
l{C'f!UPstecl instruction N 6. 14 (App. Brief p. 3; Tr. 
Oa4) is erroneous in several particulars. The request 
reads: 
''You are instructed that if you find from the 
evidence that the defendant, \\T. Ed Binghan1, did 
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not require thP deeensed child, Ln\Yl'Pnee f. Da\Y-
son, to pas~ behind ruther in front of the bus, that 
said defendant \Yas guilty of n1isconduct as a 
InattPr of la\v.' r:· pon ~uch a finding by you, you 
are further in~tructed that that 1nisconduct on the 
part of said defendant overco1nes any question 
of contributor~T negligence on the part of the de-
eeased child, La\\"Tence P. l)a\\"Son, and you 'vill 
then giYe no consideration \vhatever to any ques-
tion of c.ontributory negligence on the part of said 
child.'' 
This request is not only an in1proper application of 
Section 37-7-177 of the Utah Code, but in effect would 
1uake the bus driver absolute insurer of the safety of the 
children after they \\~ere out of his control, a\vay fron1 
the bus and irrespective of the independent intervening 
negligent act of a responsible third party. The tern1 
-~ 1nisconduct'' as used by counsel is misleading in that 
it \vas never the intention of the Legislature to abolish 
the rule or principal on contributory negligence as to 
\\Thich in this case the court \vith proper qualifications as 
to the duty of a young boy very clearly instructed the 
jury in its instr~ctions Nos. IX, X, XI, XVI and XXIII 
(Tr. 091, 0003) and with respect to which appellant has 
assigned no error. 
flereafter ans\YPring the a1·gun1ents of counsel, \:Ve 
further discuss this requested instruction. 
lnstuctions Gil:eu by the CoruTt 
.i\s to the instruetions given, of \Yhich con1plaint Is· 
1nade, n1ay \\'"e say: 
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Instruction No. 12 (p. 6 App. Brief; Tr. 324, 903) 
w·as ilnproper· because there "\\Tas no evidence that re~ 
spondent stopped his bus in a pl~e not regularly desig-
nated as a bus stop, there ''Tas a bus stop sign \¥here he 
stopped, and sueh had been a stopping place for years 
before the date on which young Da\Yson was injured, with 
nppl'oval_ of the School Board Superintendent (Tr. 227-). 
Instruction No. 13 · (p. 6, App. Brief, Tr. 093, 325) 
vvas proper, because there is no evidence that respon-
dent stoppe_d his bus in the line of traffic. 
Instruction No. 14 (p. 6 and 7, App. Brief, Tr. 093, 
325 )" "\\rhile rather unfortunately worded (the duty "to 
stop his bus in such a position as to require the children 
to pass behind rather than in front''), such wording 
was most favorable to appellant based upon appellant's 
request.- The balance of. the instruction is certainly free 
from error. 
It is self-evident that instruction No. 15 is correct 
as a 1natter of la\v, because he had a legal right and was 
authorized to take the route along Highway U. 38, and 
in taking that route, he stopped at a designated bus stop. 
F\1rther1nore, the fact that he took such alternate route 
\\eras not the proxilnate cause of the boy being run down. 
Appellant's Arguntent 
Referring no\Y to appelant's argun1ent, it would 
seern that counsel is som.e\vhat confused. They contend 
·in effect that Bingham's failure to direct the children, 
including young Dawson, to go around the rear instead 
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of the front of thP bus ". n s ~ "1nisconduet '' ; thn t '' tnis-
eonduct,. · · i~ \YOl'~P than any gradt> of negl igt>nce and 
in1plie8 'vilful \\"rung, \\·anton, rPckless conduct, or in-
tPntioual violencP, '' and that contributor~· negligence 
i~ no defe118e. \\""hile they contend that rt-sponclPnt 's 
· ·u1i~eonduct'' \\·a~ lC'arse Ilia Jl negligence, they never-
thele~~ nrgue that ~uch ""1ni~eonduct" ,,·as neglig,ence 
per se . 
..._\ppellant '~ reference t9 Section 37 ~7 -177 (p. 8 and 
1:2 .._\pp. Brief), is 1nisleading· and does not quote the 
entire section "\Yhich reads : 
"57 -7-177. Id. Violation of Regulations-
Penalty. 
Any officer or employee of any school district 
who violates any of the regulations provided for 
in the next preceding section or fails to include 
obligation to comply 'vith said regulations in any 
contract executed by then1 on behalf of a school 
district shall be guilty of n1isconduct and subject 
to removal from office of employment. Any per-
son operating a school bus under contract with a 
school district who fails to comply with any said 
regulations shall be guilty of breach of contract 
-and such contract shall be cancelled after notice 
and hearing by the responsible officers of such 
~rhool district." 
g,. thi~ and the preceding sec-tion the T_.jegislature \\·as 
not nHdertaking to change the la\\· of negligence and 
c-ontributory negligencP, nor \Yn~ it undertaking to define 
undPr \\·hat condition~ a third party could rPCOYPr danl-
f.lg'(l~ frolll tlH 1 dri\'Pl', but \\·as obYiou~1~· prP~eribiug a 
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rule of discipline in the foru1 of ren1oval fron1 office 
having application not only to the driver of a bus, but 
\vi th respect to any of the nnn1erous en1ployees of the 
sc-hool district and having respect to violation of any, of 
the nu1nerous regulations, \vhether relating to the op-
eration uf a bus or other,vise. By the ter1ns of the last 
sentence of the section quoted, the driver is given an op-
portunity for notice and hearing before the responsible 
officers of the school district before being found guilty of 
breach of his contract or niisconduct. 
"Misconduct" does not mean what counsel says it 
1neans. ''Negligence'' is in a sense a form of '' Iniscon-
duct'' and either may vary in degree as being sligh~, 
ordinary or gross, depending upon the nature of the act. 
''That tern1 is used does not change the nature ·of the 
conduct. Funk and ''T agnall 's dictionary defines the 
\Yord '' n1isc?nduct'' as '' In1proper conduct; bad be-
havior. Mismanage1nent and improper act. Instance of 
1nisbehavior: Usually in the plural." Of course, miscon-
duct 1night be casual or flagrant. It n1ight be n1ere in-
difference or it n1ight be intentional wrongdoing; but 
no reasonable pcn~on \Yould contend that Binghan1, ':vho, 
for eighteen years, had been entrusted \vith the transpor-
tation of childr(~n, \Yuuld \Yilfully, \vantonly and purposely 
fail to instruct the1u to exercise proper care for their 
safet~·, and the evidence sho,vs that it was his habit 
and practice to do so. ( Tr. 194.) Any misconduct in 
failing to give proper instructions, after notice and a 
hearing, subjected him to ''removal from offce,'' but 
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sneh failure of duty on thP partieular day in question, 
if he did so fail, cannot be regarded as a \vanton or vvil-
ful act, \\"hieh eontributed to young Dawson's death, 
e~peeially "·hen the boy and the group "\Yhich rode the 
hus ':rith hin1 "\Yere repeatedly advised to ren1ain on the 
right of the bus after alighting therefro1n until the 
bus had 1uoved a"\Yay, '"hich instruction was an even 
1nore effectiYe "\Yarning and direction than to instruct 
the1u to pass around the rear, rather than the front of 
the bus, for if they did not 1nove away after alighting 
until the bus had gone, their vision "\Y'Ould be quite clear .r 
a~ to traffic in either direction . 
. A.s before stated, \Yhile counsel see1ned to contend 
that Binghan1's alleged "misconduct" in failing to in-
struct the children to go around the rear rather than 
the front of the bus, "\vas an act ''far beyond negligence 
in scope," (Br. p. 12) they do not say just what "mis-
conduct" is that "negligence" is not, as a basis for lia-
bility, and they cite Peterson v. Standard Oil Co., (Ore.) 
106 Pac. 337, to the effect that the violation of a statute 
or municipal ordinance enacted for public safety is neg-
ligence per se. Counsel might have cited authority nearer 
home, for this Court has held that an affirmative act 
in violation of some ordinances or statutes is negligence 
per se. (Sntith v. Mine d!; Smelter Sttpply, 32 Utah 21, 
88 Pac. 687; Jensen v. Utah Potuer & , Light Co., 42 Utah 
415, 132 Pac. 8. However, \Ve have found no case ''"'hich 
goes so far as to make '' n1isconduct,'' that is the mere 
01nission of a bus driver to confor1n to a regulation that 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
he ''require all pupils to pass behind rather than in front 
of the bus," negligence per se or negligence at all, when 
it appears fron1 the evidence that he custon1arily and 
repeatedly gave the group of children, including young 
J)a,,·son, an instiuction, far u1ore effective for their saf-
ety. The regulation does not specify \Yhen or· ho\Y often 
the requirenH~nt n1ust be n1ade, and if respondent \vent 
lH'~~ond this requirernent often enough so that the chil-
dren should have co1ne custon1arily to avoid going in 
front of the bus ( Tr. 195), ho\Y can it be said that it ';vas 
a hreach of duty by Binghan1 that he did not happen, 
on one particular day, technically to, instruct or require 
then1 not to pass in front of the bus. Su-rely the word 
''require" does not obligate the driver to use physical 
force to compel the children to pass around the rear of 
the bus especially after they are beyond his reach and 
control. The objective of the regulation is the safety of 
the _children, and \Yhat respondent had done by way of 
instructions and \vhat the children understood to be his 
requiren1ent that they stand by until the bus had n1oved 
H\Ya~·, 1nore than co1nplied ''rith the regulation. H~ acted 
ns any extra careful intelligent man "\vould -ordinarily 
act. But if respondent's on1ission to ''require'' that the 
ehildren pass around the rear of the bus (whatever that 
1 nay n1ean) \YHs negligence ( \Yhich \\re deny), such neg-
ligencP \Yonld not he sufficient on \Yhich to predicate 
liability unle~;:.: it \Yas a proxin1ate cause of the injury, 
c-u1d a person charged \Yith such negligence could, of 
c·our:-3e~ interpose the defense of contributory negligencP 
or the defense of intervening act or. negligence of a re-
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ean~e and eoutributur HPglig( 1 ll<'P~ the jury \VH$ properly 
in~tructed. and they fouud in faYor of rPspondent. 
l -.OUll~Pl c.:ih1 d :~8 ~\111. J\11". pagp 854, 853 that • 't'Oll-
tributory neglig(lnee i8 not a defence to nn action based 
upon \vilful or "·anton 1nisconduct or intentional violenee. '' 
( Br. p. 1 j). Of eon r~P, that legal principle has no a p-
plication to the facts in thi.s case, because there is not a 
~cintilla of proof that Bingha1n \Yas guilty of any wilful 
or \Yanton nrisconduct, and counsel do not so allege. in 
their con1plaint. They sin1ply allege that Binghan1 ''care-
lessly and negligenty allo\Yed and permitted said n1inor, 
La \Yrence P. Da"yson, deceased, to proceed around the 
front end of said bus into said high\vay U 38 in a vvesterly 
direction, as a result of \Yhich the deceased child, La\v-
rence P. Da\vson, \\7as struck etc." (Tr. 001). This is 
nothing 1nore than the usual allegation of negligence, 
and it does not in1ply any wanton or wilful act, and of 
course~ contributory negligence may always be set up as 
a defence against any kind of negligence, even if this 
\vere negligence per se, \vhich we think it is not. 
CONCI.JUSIO~ 
Finally, it appears from the record that defendants 
Carr and Binghan1 ,,·ere sued as joint tort feasors; the 
jury was properly instructed on proxin1ate cause, on 
<·ontributory uPg-ligenee, and on the n1easure of dan1ages. 
TJu· jury found that for the \\'rong done, Carr alone \vas 
npg·lig<·nt, and that his negligence \Vas the proxi1nate 
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cause of the injury, and that .$5,000 was the full an1ount 
of compensation to which the paintiff was entitled ac-
cording to the standard of con1putation fixed by the 
court. The amount s·o fixed "\vas paid and accepted by the 
plaintiff, and Carr was released. Such payn1ent and 
rt~leace extinguished plaintiff's cause of action, and he 
cannot take his full co1npensation and attempt to have 
it duplicated. He cannot split his cause of action. If 
he had chosen to reject the jury's award, he might then 
hal'e con1e to this Court on appeal from the judgn1ent, 
and he n1ight then have assigned error with respect to the 
basis o~ each verdict, but having but one cause of action 
and having accepted the awarded compensation for the 
alleged wrong and co1npensated in full he cannot no"! 
pursue respondent to recover again. We invite attention 
to the authorities sub1nitted on the motion to dismiss the 
appeal in support of our contention. In any event, the 
judgn1en t should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted. 
STEW ART, CANNON & HANSON 
E. F. BALD\~VIN, JR. 
Atto!rneys for Respondent 
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